State v. Pacheco

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

SARENA JEAN PACHECO, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0117 PRPC
FILED 12-18-2025

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Mohave County
Nos. CR-2022-00207, CR-2022-00208
The Honorable Billy K. Sipe Jr., Judge Pro Tempore

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

APPEARANCES

Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman
By Matthew J. Smith
Counsel for Respondent

Sarena Jean Pacheco, Goodyear
Petitioner
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams, Judge Andrew M. Jacobs, and Judge
Michael S. Catlett delivered the Court’s decision.

PER CURIAM,

¶1 Petitioner Sarena Jean Pacheco seeks review of the superior
court’s order dismissing, after an evidentiary hearing, her petition for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”) filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
(“Rule”) 33. We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons
stated, grant review and deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In July 2022, Pacheco pleaded no contest to aggravated
assault, a class 5 felony, and aggravated assault, a class 3 felony. The
superior court placed her on three years of supervised probation. Two
months later, the Adult Probation Department (“APD”) petitioned to
revoke Pacheco’s probation, alleging she violated several conditions of
probation. The APD twice supplemented its petition to revoke, alleging
additional violations. The court appointed counsel to represent Pacheco for
the probation revocation proceedings.

¶3 In March 2023, Pacheco entered a probation violation plea
agreement, admitting she violated the condition that she “obey[] all laws”
(“Term 1”) by “committ[ing] the offense of Disorderly Conduct - Fighting.”
Pacheco recounted to the superior court a heated argument she had with
her boyfriend at a campground managed by the U.S. National Park Service.
She admitted engaging in disruptive conduct and acknowledged that police
intervened, but stated no charges were filed.

¶4 Pursuant to the agreement, the State dismissed all other
probation violation allegations, and the superior court had discretion to
either reinstate Pacheco on probation or to revoke it and sentence her up to
five years’ imprisonment. After accepting the plea, the court turned
immediately to disposition and sentenced Pacheco to consecutive prison
terms of six months for the class 5 aggravated assault and 3.5 years for the
class 3 aggravated assault.

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Decision of the Court

¶5 Pacheco timely petitioned for PCR wherein she alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), newly discovered evidence, and
due process violations. The superior court determined Pacheco was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on one IAC claim—that counsel failed to inform
her the probation department had changed its recommendation from
reinstatement of probation to prison in the final supplemental petition to
revoke, and she would not have entered the agreement had she been aware
of that information. The court summarily dismissed her other bases for
relief.

¶6 Pacheco and her attorney from the revocation proceedings
both testified at the hearing. The superior court found counsel’s
testimony—which included counsel’s unequivocal and specific recollection
he informed Pacheco the APD had changed their sentencing
recommendation to prison—more credible than Pacheco’s testimony. The
court denied Pacheco’s petition.

¶7 Pacheco filed a petition for review of the superior court’s
ruling. We grant review under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution, A.R.S. § 13-4239(C), and Rule 33.16.

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012).
“An abuse of discretion occurs if the PCR court makes an error of law or
fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.”
State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180, ¶ 4 (2017).

¶9 On review, Pacheco argues the superior court erred by: (1)
dismissing her IAC claim regarding the probation department’s sentencing
recommendation after the evidentiary hearing, and (2) summarily
dismissing her claim that the court improperly relied on that
recommendation.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶10 To prevail on an IAC claim, a petitioner “must demonstrate
that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that he was prejudiced thereby.” State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407, ¶ 8
(2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). In the
context of plea negotiations, Pacheco must show counsel “either (1) gave
erroneous advice or (2) failed to give information necessary to allow [her]
to make an informed decision whether to accept the plea.” State v. Donald,

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198 Ariz. 406, 413, ¶ 16 (App. 2000); see also State v. Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226,
233, ¶ 28 (2024). To show prejudice, Pacheco must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that absent her attorney’s deficient advice, she would have
rejected the state’s offer. See Donald, 198 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 20. Because the
superior court held an evidentiary hearing, our review of the court’s factual
findings “is limited to a determination of whether those findings are clearly
erroneous.” State v. Sasak, 178 Ariz. 182, 186 (App. 1993). When “the trial
court’s ruling is based on substantial evidence, this court will affirm.” Id.

¶11 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Pacheco’s IAC claim. The transcript of the evidentiary hearing supports the
court’s determination that Pacheco’s attorney both informed her of the
APD’s prison recommendation and provided her with the report
containing that recommendation. And we have no basis to disturb the
court’s credibility finding. See State v. Solano, 257 Ariz. 10, 13,
¶ 12 (App. 2024) (noting superior court is sole arbiter of witness credibility).

¶12 Pacheco argues the superior court erred in finding her
attorney credible because he gave vague answers to her questions and
failed to disclose his interview notes with her. But when the court offered
to continue the hearing to allow her time to obtain the notes, she declined
the offer.

II. Due Process

¶13 Pacheco also argues the superior court erred in relying on the
APD’s sentencing recommendation, asserting it was based on false
information that three new charges, including the admitted Term 1
violation, had been filed against her.1 Pacheco appears to argue there was
insufficient evidence she committed the Term 1 violation.

¶14 We discern no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s
summary dismissal of Pacheco’s claims, which we interpret as alleging
violations of due process. See State v. Grier, 146 Ariz. 511, 515 (1985)
(“Convicted defendants have a due process right to a fair sentencing
procedure which includes the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
information.”); see also State v. Clark, 249 Ariz. 528, 534, ¶ 18 (App. 2020)

1 The APD’s predisposition report on the second supplemental petition

states that Pacheco “was cited” for the conduct underlying the Term 1
violation and the APD changed its recommendation to prison based on
“recent events and the defendant’s third set of new charges since being
placed on probation.”

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(holding a conviction based on insufficient evidence necessarily deprives a
defendant of a fair trial).

¶15 First, the Term 1 violation was predicated on Pacheco’s
promise to “obey[ ] all laws and not engag[e] or participat[e] in any criminal
activity.” The condition was not limited to “charged” conduct, and the
probation officer had “reasonable cause to believe” Pacheco violated the
condition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.6. Pacheco’s admission to committing
disorderly conduct was sufficient to support the superior court’s finding
that she violated Term 1. See State v. Tatlow, 231 Ariz. 34, 39, ¶ 15 (App.
2012) (“The state must prove a defendant violated a term of probation by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).

¶16 Second, the record does not show the superior court “relied
on the false information [about Pacheco being charged] in passing
sentence.” Grier, 146 Ariz. at 515. The court acknowledged that Pacheco was
not charged for the conduct underlying the admitted violation, and its
decision to follow the APD’s recommendation was based on its
independent assessment of Pacheco’s conduct along with other materials
and statements provided in the case. Although Pacheco argues there was
no evidence she was charged with any other crimes—not just the admitted
disorderly conduct—the record does not reflect the superior court
mentioned or otherwise considered those other alleged charges when it
decided on a disposition.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We grant review and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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